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Abstract
Bayesian experts who are exposed to different evidence often make contra-
dictory probabilistic forecasts. An aggregator, ignorant of the underlying
model, uses this to calculate her own forecast. We use the notions of scor-
ing rules and regret to propose a natural way to evaluate an aggregation
scheme. We focus on a binary state space and construct low regret ag-
gregation schemes whenever there are only two experts which are either
Blackwell-ordered or receive conditionally i.i.d. signals. In contrast, if there
are many experts with conditionally i.i.d. signals, then no scheme performs
(asymptotically) better than a (0.5, 0.5) forecast.
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1 Introduction
Just the other day we were planning our weekend activities and looked at weather
forecast for Tel Aviv on Friday, January 27. In particular, what interested us was
the probability of rain. Accuweather’s precipitation forecast was 77%, Yahoo!’s
was 60%, and the Weather Channel’s was 90% (all three screenshots are provided
in the Appendix). It was unclear to us how to aggregate these conflicting forecasts,
although we knew that all three were from reputable sources that were using sound
weather models and reliable data.
Our dilemma is not unique. In fact, many of us face conflicting advice from
experts on a daily basis: forecasts from reliable pollsters on the outcome of pres-
idential elections, medical prognoses from trusted physicians, investment advice
from experienced financial pundits, and more.
This challenge is in fact inherent in many governing bodies. In the political
arena we often see ministers and legislators who as elected officials must decide on
critical issues and policies while lacking subject-matter expertise. These publicly
elected officials dictate health care policies, decide on military development and de-
ployment, financial regulation, and so on, without any medical/military/financial
background. As a result, they reach out to experts for advice, such as ad-hoc com-
mittees, civil servants with years of experience, lobbyists, and more. Similar to
elected officials, board members of commercial companies are often seasoned busi-
ness people with managerial experience who often lack industry-specific knowledge.
These board members essentially need to aggregate input from various experts in
order to make a decision.
We consider a model with two types of agents. A set of non-strategic experts
share a common prior over the state space. Each expert receives a private signal
that induces a posterior distribution (the expert’s forecast). In contrast, an ig-
norant aggregator is not familiar with the common prior and the signal structure
(we refer to this pair as the information structure). The aggregator observes the
experts’ forecasts and must aggregate them into a single forecast. How should
we evaluate the aggregator and what is his best course of action? These are the
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questions we are interested in.
To study this we first elucidate four aspects of the model:
• How to measure the accuracy of a forecast? A natural and prevalent family
of measures of forecast accuracy, and the one we adopt here, is that of proper
scoring rules (see [Brier, 1950]) and in particular the square loss function.
The appealing property of proper scoring rules is that they induce a Bayesian
expert to be truthful about his forecast.
• How to model an expert? An expert has some prior distribution over the
state space and receives a private signal that he then uses to compute a
posterior distribution using Bayes rule. All experts share a common prior
but signals are private.
• How to model an ignorant aggregator? An aggregator is ignorant if his
forecast is a function of a vector of experts’ forecasts only. In particular,
an ignorant aggregator’s forecast is not a function of the underlying infor-
mation structure. Obviously, his forecast is inferior compared with some
hypothetical omniscient expert. This omniscient expert knows the vector of
forecasts and in addition knows the information structure and the vector of
private signals observed by the experts. The score attained by the hypo-
thetical omniscient expert’s forecast serves as a benchmark for out ignorant
aggregator.
• How to evaluate an ignorant aggregator’s performance? For a given scoring
rule and information structure one can compute the ignorant aggregator’s
relative loss, which is the difference between his expected score and that of
the omniscient expert. However, given that the ignorant aggregator is unfa-
miliar with the information structure, it is not clear whether it should serve
to evaluate his performance. Here we adopt the robust (or, equivalently, the
adversarial) approach. We say that the ignorant aggregator can guarantee
a regret of α in a given class of information structures if his relative loss is
at most α, for all information structures in the given class.
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One important aspect of our model is that it pertains to a single interaction.
In particular, the aggregator has no prior experience with the experts and he
cannot observe past realizations. We argue that this single interaction condition is
realistic in some settings. Aggregating prognoses from physicians is typically a one-
off challenge, for example. Similarly, aggregating economic forecasts is important
when deciding on a mortgage and for many of us this is the only time it is called
for. However, even if aggregators repeatedly interact with experts and have an
opportunity to learn, there is always the challenge of the first interaction and
often, typically with publicly elected officials, the first impression matters.
1.1 Our Contribution
Our results are as follows. We start with the case where there are two experts.
We notice (see Proposition 1 in Section 3) that without any restriction on the
information structure the ignorant aggregator cannot guarantee any regret below
1
4
. A regret of 1
4
is trivially achievable by constantly announcing 1
2
irrespective of
experts’ forecasts (we recall that we measure accuracy by the square loss function).
We proceed with the case where the two experts are Blackwell-ordered, in the
sense that one is strictly better informed than the other. In this case Theorem 1
provides an exact formula for the minimal regret, 1
8
(5
√
5−11) ≈ 0.0225, as well as
the aggregation scheme that guarantees it. We introduce an aggregation scheme
that is based on the precision of the two forecasts that guarantees a regret of
1
8
(5
√
5− 11), and prove that no aggregation scheme can guarantee a regret below
1
8
(5
√
5− 11).
We then study the case where the experts’ signals are distributed independently
conditional on the realized state. In such an environment the prior and the experts’
forecasts are a sufficient statistic to perform the optimal Bayesian aggregation. In
our case, the ignorant aggregator does not know the prior. A natural approach in
such an environment is to guess the prior and perform the aggregation as if the
guess equaled the actual prior. This approach yields the average prior aggregation
scheme, where the guess is simply the average of the two forecasts and results in
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a regret of 0.0260 (see Theorem 2). This need not be the optimal scheme but we
show that the optimal scheme cannot do much better and is bounded below by
1
8
(5
√
5−11) ≈ 0.0225, the exact same regret as that of the Blackwell-order setting.
We discuss the gap of 0.0260 − 0.0225 = 0.0035 and some related conjectures in
Appendix B.
Finally, we consider the case of a large number of experts n with independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) signals. For this case we show in Theorem 4
that poor performance is unavoidable and the best possible regret that can be
guaranteed by the aggregator, as a function of n, approaches 1
4
as n → ∞. This
result highlights the significance of the common prior assumption in large-scale
aggregation of information. We note that in order to apply optimal information
aggregation (i.e., the aggregation achieved by the omniscient expert) it is suffi-
cient for the aggregtor to know the prior; optimal aggregation does not require
a knowledge of the information structure or the signals, but of just the forecasts
and the prior. Without the knowledge of the prior, the ignorant aggregator cannot
identify the state with probability one, as has been demonstrated by [Prelec et al.,
2017] and [Arieli et al., 2017].
We show a much stronger negative result. Not only can the aggregator not
identify the state, he cannot even aggregate the information into some intelligent
forecast other than 1
2
. In other words, for the worst-case information structure,
the aggregator’s (approximately) best course of action is to ignore the forecasts
and predict 1
2
, which guarantees him a loss of 1
4
. There is no procedure that
significantly improves upon this one.
1.2 Related Literature
Forecast aggregation is a strand of the statistics literature both within the classic
approach and within the more modern “machine learning” approach. It encom-
passes three lines of research whose focus is different from ours.
First, within the Bayesian paradigm forecast aggregation studies the actual
structure of the Bayesian aggregation scheme for a variety of parametric informa-
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tion structures such as information that induces independent log-Normal poste-
riors for the experts [Satopa¨a¨ et al., 2014], or the partial information framework
[Ernst et al., 2016, Satopa¨a¨ et al., 2016].1 We primarily depart from these papers
by considering a forecast aggregator who does not share the experts’ common prior
or their information structure. All he knows is the actual forecasts.
Second, it considers data-driven heuristics for aggregating forecasts. Given
some past data of forecasts and realizations, it studies the performance of various
heuristics on the data set. This results in optimal heuristics for specific data
structures (see, e.g., [Bermingham and D’Agostino, 2014] for an excellent literature
survey). Our approach and the resulting heuristics are agnostic to any available
data as long as the underlying assumption on the information structure is valid.
The machine-learning community has developed techniques for integrating the
advice of multiple experts, whether in the form of forecasts or in the form of
proposed action (such as portfolio selection in a financial market setting). The goal
of these techniques is regret minimization. In that model an ignorant aggregator
(the “machine” in their jargon) repeatedly receives input from multiple experts
and takes an action based on a vector of the experts’ advice. At each stage, the
aggregator is paid according to some function that depends on her action and the
temporal state of nature. The “regret” measures how much worse, in hindsight,
the aggregator performs as compared with the best expert. The literature provides
a variety of settings and schemes for choosing actions such that the average per-
stage regret goes to zero. The reader is referred to [Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006]
for a review on this topic. The major distinction with our work is that it considers
a repeated setting whereas we study a one-shot model, about which the machine
learning literature is mute.
Another related research topic is that of expert testing and in particular mul-
tiple expert testing. [Al-Najjar and Weinstein, 2008] and [Feinberg and Stewart,
2008] ask how a policy maker should identify which of the experts is better in-
formed. The advisee in their case does not aggregate the advice but rather chooses
which of the experts to follow. In contrast with our model, the expert-testing set-
1See [Satopa¨a¨ et al., 2014] for an excellent review of this literature.
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ting does not assume a common prior among the experts. It assumes that the
advisee has many past observations consisting of experts’ forecasts and realiza-
tions and is once again mute about single-stage interaction. One natural test
for ranking experts, in the context of prediction in financial markets, is that of
portfolio returns. [Sandroni, 2000] shows that indeed the better-informed expert
outperforms the less-informed one in the long run.
Finally, in a companion paper [Arieli et al., 2017] we use a similar model to
study the conditions under which an aggregator can perfectly learn the state of
the world (and in particular obtain a regret of zero) whenever there are many i.i.d.
experts.
2 Model
Let Ω = {0, 1} denote the binary state of nature. An information structure for
n experts, denoted by (S,P), consists of some n-dimensional signal space, S =
S1 × · · · × Sn, and a distribution P ∈ ∆(Ω × S). Let µ = P(ω = 1) denote the
prior probability of the state ω = 1. Expert i receives a signal si ∈ Si, drawn
according to P, and announces his forecast, xi(si) = P(ω = 1|si) (his conditional
probability for the state ω = 1).
We consider an ignorant aggregator who is ignorant with respect to the in-
formation structure and observes only the vector of experts’ forecasts x(s) =
(x1(s1), . . . , xn(sn)). An aggregation scheme of n forecasts is a function f :
[0, 1]n → [0, 1]. We study settings where the ignorant aggregator may have partial
knowledge about the information structure. This partial knowledge takes the form
of a subset of such structures (a class of information structures). We compare the
performance of the ignorant aggregator with that of the omniscient expert, i.e.,
an expert who knows P and observes all the signals of all the agents. Note that
this is the most competitive benchmark we can set to evaluate an aggregator’s
performance. For a discussion of less competitive benchmarks, see Section 7.1.
The basic building block for evaluating the performance of the aggregators is
a scoring rule, which is a function l : Ω × [0, 1] → R. In words, it assigns a loss
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to any pair of realization and forecast (probability of the state ω = 1). A proper
scoring rule [Brier, 1950] is a scoring rule for which the minimal expected loss is
obtained when the forecast is equal to the actual distribution. Hence, a proper
scoring rule incentivizes the omniscient expert to report the posterior probability.
One prominent example of a proper scoring rule, which is central to our analysis,
is the square loss function:
l(ω, x) =
(1− x)
2 if ω = 1
x2 if ω = 0.
Conditional on the information structure (S,P), the ignorant aggregator can
only hope to do as well as the omniscient expert. The omniscient expert’s best
prediction is obtained using Bayes rule and is equal to xˆ(s) = P(ω = 1|s), where
s = (s1, . . . , sn). Hence the expected relative loss of the aggregation scheme g is
L(g,P) = EP[l(xˆ(s), ω)− l(f(x(s)), ω)].
Given a class of information structures, C, the regret of the aggregation scheme
g over C is the expected relative loss in the worst-case scenario:2
RC(f) = sup
P∈C
L(f,P). (1)
We start with a preliminary observation that provides an alternative formula
for the relative loss of an aggregation scheme.
Lemma 1. For every information structure P and aggregation scheme f : [0, 1]n →
R it holds that
L(f,P) = E(ω,s1,...,sn)∼P[(f(x1(s1), . . . , x(sn))− xˆ(s1, . . . , sn))2].
2The term ‘regret’ is inspired by terminology introduced by [Hannan, 1957] in the context of
measuring success under a worst-case scenario. In a way this is also reminiscent of [Gilboa and
Schmeidler, 1989]’s notion of MinMax expectation.
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Proof. For every realized vector of signals s = (s1, . . . , sn),
Eω[(f(x(s))− ω)2 − (xˆ(s))− ω)2|s] =
P(ω = 1|s)[(f(x(s))− 1)2 − (xˆ(s))− 1)2]+
P(ω = 0|s)[(f(x1(s)))2 − (xˆ(s))2] =
xˆ(s)[(f(x(s))− 1)2 − (xˆ(s)− 1)2] + (1− xˆ(s))[(f(x(s)))2 − (xˆ(s))2] =
[(f(x(s))2 − 2xˆ(s)f(x(s)) + (xˆ(s))2] =
(f(x(s))− xˆ(s))2.
Since the equation holds for every s = (s1, . . . , sn) it holds also in expectation over
s = (s1, . . . , sn).
3 General Information Structures
The trivial aggregation scheme, f(x1, x2) =
1
2
, ignores the forecasts made by the
two experts yet guarantees a regret of 1
4
. Our first observation is that no other
aggregation scheme can outperform this. In fact, the following is a slightly stronger
result:
Proposition 1. There exists an information structure P, such that for every
aggregation scheme f, it holds that L(f,P) ≥ 1
4
.
Proof. Let Si = {si, s′i} for i = 1, 2 and let P be the following distribution:
ω = 0 ω = 1
s2 s
′
2 s2 s
′
2
s1 1/4 0 s1 0 1/4
s′1 0 1/4 s
′
1 1/4 0
It is easy to check that xi(si) = xi(s
′
i) =
1
2
and xˆ(s1, s2) = xˆ(s
′
1, s
′
2) = 0 and
xˆ(s1, s
′
2) = xˆ(s
′
1, s2) = 1. Namely, each one of the signals separately is uninforma-
tive, but together they reveal the state of nature. The ignorant aggregator always
observes two forecasts of 1
2
, and has no better action than forecasting 1
2
. On the
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other hand, the omniscient expert always knows the state (w.p. 1). Therefore, for
every aggregation scheme f the relative loss is at least 1
4
− 0.
In Section 7.1.1 we show that the high regret obtained in Proposition 1 holds
even when we benchmark the ignorant aggregator against a less challenging expert;
the Bayesian aggregator.3
Thus, ignorantly aggregating forecasts without any restriction on the family
of information structures is impossible. What can be done when we consider
special classes of information structures? Apparently, for some natural classes of
information structures there are aggregation schemes that guarantee a surprisingly
low regret.
4 Blackwell-Ordered Experts
An interesting case to analyse in our settings is the scenario where one expert is
more informed than the other.
Definition 1. An information structure (S1, S2,P) is Blackwell-ordered, if there
exists some set, S ′2, such that S2 = (S1 × S ′2) or, symmetrically, there exists some
set, S ′1, such that S1 = (S
′
1 × S2). Let BO denote the set of all Blackwell-ordered
information structures.
In words, the better-informed expert has access to the signal available to the
less-informed expert and he receives an additional private signal. This notion
is equivalent to the notion of Blackwell domination and Blackwell ordering; see
[Blackwell, 1953].
Similarly to (1), we define the regret of an aggregation scheme f in Blackwell
environment to be
RBO(f) = sup
P∈BO
L(f,P).
To gain some intuition about the problem, we study the regret of two simple
and naive aggregation schemes.
3The Bayesian aggregator knows the information structure and the experts’ forecasts. How-
ever, in contrast with the omniscient expert, he does not observe the experts’ private signals.
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4.1 Naive aggregation schemes
The DeGroot scheme
Consider the naive aggregation scheme f(x1, x2) =
1
2
x1+
1
2
x2, which coincides with
the celebrated DeGroot opinion formation function (see [DeGroot, 1974]). Recall
that our criterion of success computes the regent under an adversarial information
structure. Consider the following information structure. Assume that the prior is
µ = 1
2
and that Expert 1 receives no additional information while Expert 2 learns
the realized state ω. The resulting pair of forecasts will be (1
2
, 0) and (1
2
, 1), each
with probability 1
2
. The aggregator’s forecast, under the naive DeGroot scheme,
will be either 1
4
or 3
4
, each with probability 1
2
. In both cases the forecast will differ
by 1
4
from that of the better expert and hence the regret in the square loss utilities
is at least 1
16
= 0.0625.4
The minimal entropy scheme
0 0.3 0.7 1
0.2 0.8
0.5 0.5
5
7
2
7
2
7
5
7
X2
X1
Figure 1: The martingale X1, X2.
In a Bayesian framework, whenever one of the experts’ forecasts is extreme
(xi ∈ {0, 1}), he is correct with probability 1 and the aggregator should adopt his
forecast independently of the information structure. A naive generalization of this
4In fact, this information structure leads to the worst-case relative loss and so the regret of
the DeGroot scheme is exactly 116 = 0.0625.
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is to follow the expert whose forecast is more informative, in terms of entropy.
This implies adopting the more extreme forecast. Formally,
f(x1, x2) =
x1 if |x1 −
1
2
| > |x2 − 12 |
x2 otherwise.
As it turns out, this aggregation scheme does not always perform well. To see this
we first note that by the splitting lemma of Aumann and Maschler [Aumann et al.,
1995] there is an identification between Blackwell-ordered information structures
and martingales (X0, X1, X2) of posteriors. X0 = µ is the prior, X1 is the posterior
of the less-informed expert, and X2 is the posterior of the more-informed expert.
Consider the posterior belief martingale (X0, X1, X2) with expectation X0 =
1
2
and where X1 = 0.2, 0.8 with equal probabilities. The conditional probabilities for
X2 are: P (X2 = 0|X1 = 0.2) = 57 , P (X2 = 0.7|X1 = 0.2) = 27 and, symmetrically,
P (X2 = 1|X1 = 0.8) = 57 , P (X2 = 0.3|X1 = 0.8) = 27 . Figure 1 visualizes this
martingale.
In this information structure with probability 1
7
the ignorant aggregator’s ob-
serves the pair of forecasts (0.2, 0.7). Based on f the ignorant aggregator predicts
the more extreme forecast 0.2 whereas the omniscient expert forecast is 0.7. Sym-
metrically, with probability 1
7
the ignorant aggregator observes the pair (0.8, 0.3)
and predicts 0.8, which, once again, is 0.5 away from the forecast of the better-
informed expert. Thus, the induced regret is at least 2
7
· 1
4
≈ 0.0714, which is even
worse than that of the simple average aggregation scheme.
4.2 Optimal Aggregation
The analysis of the two naive forecast aggregation schemes and the correspond-
ing information structures suggests that a regret-minimizing aggregation scheme
should assign weights to the forecasts that do depend on their distance from 1
2
(greater distance translates to more weight) but not too radically. The formula of
the precision scheme, which we turn to discuss, follows this intuition. We denote
12
by φ(x) = 1
x(1−x) the precision of a forecast x.
5 The idea is to assign weights to
the two forecasts proportional to their precision. More concretely, we define the
precision scheme as follows.
fpre(x1, x2) =

φ(x1)
φ(x1)+φ(x2)
x1 +
φ(x2)
φ(x1)+φ(x2)
x2 if |x1 − x2| ≤ 0.4
√
φ(x1)√
φ(x1)+
√
φ(x2)
x1 +
√
φ(x2)√
φ(x1)+
√
φ(x2)
x2 if |x1 − x2| > 0.4.
In addition, for x1, x2 < 1 set fpre(0, x2) = fpre(x1, 0) = 0 and for x1, x2 > 0 set
fpre(1, x2) = fpre(x1, 1) = 1. We also set
6 fpre(0, 1) = fpre(1, 0) =
1
2
. Our main
result for this section is the following:
Theorem 1. For Blackwell-ordered information structures, the precision scheme
guarantees a regret of 1
8
(5
√
5−11) ≈ 0.0225425. Moreover, no aggregation scheme
guarantees a lower regret. In other words, RBO(fpre) = 18(5
√
5−11) ≤ RBO(f) for
any aggregation scheme f .
Note that the interaction can be modelled as a zero-sum game between an
ignorant aggregator (who chooses f) and an adversary (who chooses P). The proof
relies on an explicit formulation of the maxmin strategies of both the adversary
and the aggregator in this zero-sum game. Once formulated, the proof is relatively
easy, as it is then sufficient to show that the presented strategies guarantee the
value 1
8
(5
√
5 − 11) for both sides. In Section A we provide some intuition as to
how we derived these maxmin strategies.
Proof. We start by presenting an optimal strategy for the adversary. Namely,
we present a distribution over two Blackwell ordered information structures, such
that an aggregator who knows the mixed strategy of the adversary cannot achieve
a regret below 1
8
(5
√
5− 11). This obviously implies that our ignorant aggregator
cannot achieve a better regret either.
5In statistics, the precision of a random variable is the reciprocal of the variance. The forecast
x means that expert belief is that the state is a Bernoulli random variable with probability x.
Thus, φ(x) = 1x(1−x) is the precision of the forecast.
6Note that the probability that the experts’ forecasts are either (1, 0) or (0, 1), is zero in any
information structure.
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We set the prior to µ = 1
2
. The less-informed expert receives one of two signals
that yield posteriors of x ∈ (0, 1
2
) and 1 − x with equal probability 1
2
; i.e., the
less-informed agent observes a noisy binary signal that is compatible with the
correct state with probability 1 − x. Conditional on the posterior x, the more-
informed expert observes an additional signal that yields posteriors of 0 and 1−x
with probabilities 1−2x
1−x and
x
1−x respectively. Such an information structure exists
by the Aumann-Maschler splitting lemma [Aumann et al., 1995]. Symmetrically,
conditional on the posterior 1−x, the more-informed expert observes an additional
signal that yields posteriors of x and 1 with probabilities x
1−x and
1−2x
1−x respectively.
Figure 2 demonstrates the martingale of posteriors for the less- and more-informed
experts.
0 x 1− x 1
x 1− x
0.5 0.5
1−2x
1−x
x
1−x
x
1−x
1−2x
1−x
More-informed
Less-informed
Figure 2: The martingale of posteriors.
Now consider the mixed strategy where the more informed expert is chosen to
be Expert 1 or Expert 2 with equal probability 1
2
. In the case where the ignorant
aggregator observes the pair of forecasts {x, 1−x}, which occurs with probability
x
1−x , he does not know who the better-informed expert is. In fact he assigns
equal probability 1
2
to the event that Expert i = 1, 2 is the more-informed expert.
Therefore, his optimal prediction in such a case is 1
2
, which is (1
2
− x)-far from
the omniscient expert forecast. Thus, the relative loss of any aggregation scheme
against this mixed strategy is at least x
1−x(
1
2
− x)2. Maximizing over x ∈ (0, 1
2
)
yields a regret of 1
8
(5
√
5− 11), which is obtained for x = 1
4
(3−√5).
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We now prove that the average prior scheme guarantees a regret of at most
1
8
(5
√
5−11). Note that the precision scheme is anonymous, namely, fpre(x1, x2) =
fpre(x2, x1). Therefore, the adversary’s best reply against the precision scheme
contains an information structure where Expert 2 is the more-informed expert.
Henceforth, we restrict attention to such information structures. Now, the ad-
versary’s strategy can be viewed as a martingale X0, X1, X2 of length 2, where
X0 = µ is the prior, and Xi is the posterior of Expert i. By Lemma 1 the relative
loss is given by L(fpre, (X0, X1, X2)) = Exi∼Xi [(fpre(x1, x2)− x2)2].
0 x z 1
y
z−y
z−x
y−x
z−x
Figure 3: Mx,y,z, the extreme points of the class of martingales.
For x < y < z we denote by Mx,y,z the martingale where X0 = X1 = y with
probability 1, X2 = x with probability
z−y
z−x , and X2 = z with probability
y−x
z−x ,
see Figure 3. Note that the set of martingales of length 2 is a convex set whose
extreme points are exactly {Mx,y,z}0≤x≤y≤z≤1. Moreover, note that the adversary’s
utility is linear in the representation of the martingale. Namely, for a martingale
that is given by the convex combination M =
∑
(x,y,z)∈W αx,y,zMx,y,z we have
L(M, f) =
∑
(x,y,z)∈W
αx,y,zL(Mx,y,z, f).
Therefore, given the aggregation scheme fpre, the adversary has a best reply to
fpre of the form Mx,y,z. From this we deduce that
RBO(fpre) = sup
(x,y,z)∈[0,1]3:x≤y≤z
L(Mx,y,z, fpre).
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Consider the following four compact ranges in [0, 1]3:
K1 = {(x, y, z)|x ≤ y ≤ z, |x− y| ≥ 0.4, |z − y| ≥ 0.4}
K2 = {(x, y, z)|x ≤ y ≤ z, |x− y| ≤ 0.4, |z − y| ≥ 0.4}
K3 = {(x, y, z)|x ≤ y ≤ z, |x− y| ≥ 0.4, |z − y| ≤ 0.4}
K4 = {(x, y, z)|x ≤ y ≤ z, |x− y| ≤ 0.4, |z − y| ≤ 0.4}.
We note that for every triplet (x, y, z) where x ≤ y ≤ z, there exists 1 ≤ m ≤ 4
such that (x, y, z) ∈ Km and the relative loss of f on each of the Km is determined
by a fixed loss function. For example, for (x, y, z) in K1 we have
EPx,y,z [l(x2, ω)− l(fpre(x1, x2), ω)] =
z − y
z − x
(√
x(1− x)y +√y(1− y)x√
x(1− x) +√y(1− y) − x
)2
+
y − x
z − x
(√
y(1− y)z +√z(1− z)y√
y(1− y) +√z(1− z) − z
)2
.
Similarly, in range K2 we have
EPx,y,z [l(x2, ω)− l(fpre(x1, x2), ω)] =
z − y
z − x
(
x(1− x)y + y(1− y)x
x(1− x) + y(1− y) − x
)2
+
y − x
z − x
(√
y(1− y)z +√z(1− z)y√
y(1− y) +√z(1− z) − z
)2
.
Similar expressions can be obtained for ranges K4 and K3.
Thus, in order to show that fpre guarantees a regret of at most
1
8
(5
√
5− 11) to
the ignorant aggregator, one need only solve four three-dimensional optimization
problems in the four compact domains {Ki}i=1,2,3,4. These optimization problems
has been solved by Matlab, which shows that the global maximum of R(x, y, z) is
obtained at two points (0, 1
4
(3−√5), 1− 1
4
(3−√5)) and (1
4
(3−√5), 1− 1
4
(3−√5), 1)
and is equal to 1
8
(5
√
5− 11).
5 Two Conditionally Independent Experts
Another family of information structures that is prevalent in the economics litera-
ture is that of experts who receive independent signals, conditional on the realized
state. We refer to this as a conditionally independent information structure. In
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such settings, knowing the prior µ = P(ω = 1) together with the posteriors
x1, x2, . . . , xn is a sufficient statistic for the omniscient expert. It is straightfor-
ward to verify the following (see, e.g., [Bordley, 1982]): if P(ω = 1|si) = xi for
1 ≤ i ≤ n, then
P(ω = 1|s1, . . . , sn) = g(µ, x1, . . . , xn) = (1− µ)
n−1∏n
i=1 xi
(1− µ)n−1∏ni=1 xi + µn−1∏ni=1(1− xi) .
The ignorant aggregator, however, does not know the prior. Nevertheless, this
observation induces a natural family of aggregation schemes, where Bayes rule is
applied to a “dummy” prior (or a guess). The guess of the prior can be based
on the experts’ forecasts. It turns out that the resulting regret is surprisingly low
when the number of experts is 2 and the aggregator uses the standard average
of the two forecasts as his guess for the prior. This guess entails the following
aggregation scheme, which we refer to as the average-prior scheme:
favg(x1, x2) = g(
x1 + x2
2
, x1, x2) =
x1x2(1− x1+x22 )
x1x2(1− x1+x22 ) + (1− x1)(1− x2)x1+x22
Let CI be the class of all independent information structures for two experts.
Theorem 2. RCI(favg) = 0.0260, that is, the average prior scheme guarantees a
regret of 0.0260. Moreover, for every aggregation scheme f it holds that RCI(f) ≥
1
8
(5
√
5 − 11) ≈ 0.0225. That is, no aggregation scheme guarantees a regret lower
than 1
8
(5
√
5− 11) ≈ 0.0225.
Proof. We begin by introducing a strategy for the adversary that guarantees him
a regret of at least 1
8
(5
√
5 − 11). Namely, we present a distribution over two
conditionally independent information structures, such that an aggregator who
knows the mixed strategy of the adversary cannot achieve a regret below 1
8
(5
√
5−
11).7 This obviously implies that our ignorant aggregator cannot achieve a better
regret, either.
Consider the mixed strategy that randomizes uniformly over the following two
conditionally independent structures. In the first information structure the prior
is x ∈ (0, 1
2
). The signals are conditionally identically distributed signals that
7In fact the distribution is over conditionally i.i.d. information structures.
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Figure 4: Distribution over priors and posteriors of a single agent.
induce their posterior belief 0 and 1
2
with probabilities 1− 2x and 2x respectively
(by Aumann and Maschler’s splitting lemma [Aumann et al., 1995] such a signal
structure exists). In the second information structure the prior is 1 − x ∈ (1
2
, 1).
The posterior beliefs are 1 and 1
2
with probabilities 1− 2x and 2x respectively. A
visualization of the adversary’s mixed strategy appears in Figure 4.
When the realizations of the two forecasts turn out to be x1 = x2 =
1
2
, an
ignorant aggregator does not know whether the prior was x or 1 − x, while a
omniscient expert does. Simple symmetry arguments show that the best forecast
for a ignorant aggregator in such an event is 1
2
, whereas a omniscient expert
forecasts
1
2
1
2
(1− x)
1
2
1
2
(1− x) + 1
2
1
2
x
= 1− x and
1
2
1
2
x
1
2
1
2
x+ 1
2
1
2
(1− x) = x,
depending on whether the prior was x or 1 − x respectively. By Lemma 1 the
relative loss in the event of x1 = x2 =
1
2
is (1
2
− x)2. A simple calculation shows
that the probability of the event x1 = x2 =
1
2
is x
1−x . Therefore, the relative loss
of an aggregator who knows the adversary’s strategy is
x
1− x(
1
2
− x)2.
Maximizing the relative loss over x ∈ (0, 1
2
) yields a regret 1
8
(5
√
5− 11), which is
obtained at x = 1
4
(3−√5). This proves that no aggregation scheme can guarantee
a regret below 1
8
(5
√
5− 11).
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Next we shall prove that any strategy of the adversary against the average prior
scheme yields a relative loss of at most 0.0260 to the aggregator. An adversary
can be viewed as a triple (µ,P1,P2) where µ is the prior, and Pi ∈ ∆([0, 1]) is a
distribution of Expert i’s posterior beliefs with expectation E(Pi) = µ. Assume
that Pi assigns a prior probability of pi to the posterior xi. Simple calculations
show that the probability of the pair of posteriors being (x1, x2) is given by the
following expression that is multilinear in p1 and p2:
h(p1, p2, µ, x1, x2) = p1p2
(
(1− x1)(1− x2)
1− µ +
x1x2
µ
)
.
By Lemma 1 the relative loss of the aggregator in the case where (x1, x2) is the
realized posterior probability is
r(µ, x1, x2) =
(
x1x2(1− µ)
x1x2(1− µ) + (1− x1)(1− x2)µ
− x1x2(1−
x1+x2
2
)
x1x2(1− x1+x22 ) + (1− x1)(1− x2)x1+x22
)2
.
(2)
For every y ≤ µ ≤ z let Piµ,y,z be a posterior distribution with support {y, z} such
that x is realized with probability z−µ
z−y and y is realized with probability
µ−y
z−y . These
are the extreme points of the convex set of all posterior distributions. Namely, any
distribution Pi can be written as Pi =
∑
j α
i
jP
i
µ,yij ,z
i
j
, where
∑
j α
1
j =
∑
j α
2
j = 1.
The multilinearity of the relative loss implies the following formula on the expected
relative loss:
L(favg, (µ,P
1,P2)) =
∑
j,k
α1jα
2
kL((µ,P
1
µ,y1j ,z
1
j
,P2µ,y2k,z2k
), favg) (3)
which is a convex combination of relative losses of the form L(favg, (µ,P
1
µ,y1,z1 ,P
2
µ,y2,z2)).
Therefore, the regret that an adversary can achieve against the average aggrega-
tion scheme is given by
max
µ,y1≤µ≤z1,y2≤µ≤z2
L((µ,P1µ,y1,z1 ,P
2
µ,y2,z2), favg).
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Note also that the objective function has a closed formula:
L((µ,P1µ,y1,z1 ,P
2
µ,y2,z2), favg) =h(
z1 − µ
z1 − y1 ,
z2 − µ
z2 − y2 , µ, y1, y2) · r(µ, y1, y2)+
h(
z1 − µ
z1 − y1 ,
µ− y2
z2 − y2 , µ, y1, z2) · r(µ, y1, z2)+
h(
µ− y1
z1 − y1 ,
z2 − µ
z2 − y2 , µ, z1, y2) · r(µ, z1, y2)+
h(
µ− y1
z1 − y1 ,
µ− y2
z2 − y2 , µ, z1, z2) · r(µ, z1, z2).
(4)
In summary, we have shown that, given the aggregation scheme f , the adversary’s
best-reply problem can be reduced to a concrete maximization problem over five
parameters µ, y1, y2, z1, z2. Matlab calculations show that the global maximum
of this five-variable fraction is obtained at the point µ = 0.120, y1 = 0.120,
z1 = 0.120, y2 = 0, z2 = 0.746 and is equal to 0.0260.
8
5.1 Mind the gap
Theorem 2 leaves a gap between the upper and lower regret bounds whenever the
information structure is conditionally independent. We are not able to close this
gap; however, we can slightly improve the upper bound by using a non-intuitive
variant of the average prior scheme. That is, instead of updating the two posterior
with respect to their average we determine the “dummy” prior as follows:
ep(x1, x2) =
0.49x1 + 0.49x2 if x1 + x2 ≤ 10.49x1 + 0.49x2 + 0.02 otherwise. (5)
Proposition 2. For conditionally independent information structures, the aggre-
gation scheme, f(x1, x2) = g(ep(x1, x2), x1, x2), guarantees a regret of 0.0250.
The proof of Proposition 2, which bares a similarity to the proof of the first
part of Theorem 2, is relegated to appendix C.
In many economic models, signals, in addition to being conditionally inde-
pendent, are also identical. For this case we conjecture that the regret bound of
1
8
(5
√
5−11) ≈ 0.0225 is tight and that the average prior scheme is indeed optimal.
8Note that the adversarial best-reply corresponds to an information structure where the first
expert receives no information.
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Conjecture 3. For conditionally i.i.d. information structures, the minimal regret
that can be guaranteed is equal to 1
8
(5
√
5 − 11) ≈ 0.0225, and the average prior
scheme guarantees this regret.
We discuss this conjecture further in Appendix B.
6 Many Conditionally Independent Experts
We turn to study how the regret of the ignorant aggregator is affected as the
number of independent experts grows. Intuitively, the more forecasts he has at
his disposal, the better the ignorant aggregator will perform. This intuition is
stronger when experts are additionally assumed identical. However, one should
note that the prevalence of more experts allows the omniscient expert, who serves
as a benchmark, to improve as well. Hence, in terms of regret the aforementioned
intuition may be misleading.
Let Dn be the class of all i.i.d. information structures with n experts. The
interplay between the improvement of the ignorant aggregator and that of the
omniscient expert is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. For any number of conditionally independent and identical experts,
n, and any aggregation scheme, f : [0, 1]n → R, the following bound on regret
holds: RDn(f) ≥ 14 − 3
√
logn
n
.
Thus, as the number of agents grows no aggregation scheme can guarantee a
performances that does better than the fixed scheme that always forecasts 0.5.
This stands in sharp contrast to the n = 2 case. The proof of Theorem 4 is
relegated to Appendix D. Below we discuss the key ideas of the proof.
6.1 Idea of the proof of Theorem 4
We start the discussion with the following example (which appears also in [Arieli
et al., 2017] and in [Prelec et al., 2017]). Consider the following two information
structures for a single expert: The priors in these two information structures are
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Table 1: The information structures I(1), I(2).
I(1) :
ω = 0 ω = 1
s0
3
8
1
8
s1
1
8
3
8
I(2) :
ω = 0 ω = 1
s0
3
40
1
40
s1
9
40
27
40
µ1 =
1
2
and µ2 =
7
10
, respectively.
Let us denote by (e.m.ω), where m = 1, 2 and ω = 0, 1, the event that the
information structure is I(m) and the state is ω. A straightforward computation
shows that the distribution over the experts’ posteriors (forecasts) is identical for
the two events (e.1.1) and (e.2.0). In both cases every expert will either observe
s0 with probability
1
4
and forecast 1
4
or will observe s1 with probability
3
4
and will
forecast 3
4
. Let us denote this posterior distribution over forecasts by ψ
Consider an adversary’s mixed strategy over these two information structures
with weights 1−µ2
1−µ2+µ1 =
3
8
assigned to information structure I(1) and µ1
1−µ2+µ1 =
5
8
to information structure I(2). Our ignorant aggregator cannot perform better
than a Bayesian aggregator, who knows the two information structures, the mixed
strategy, and the forecasts (notice that, unlike the omniscient expert, this hypo-
thetical Bayesian aggregator cannot observe the actual signals).
Assume that n is large enough so that the empirical distribution of the sample
of n forecasts is “essentially” equal to the precise posterior distribution. Thus, in
events (e.1.1) and (e.2.0) the Bayesian aggregator will observe ψ and his Bayesian
belief about the event ω = 1 will be 3/8·µ1
3/8·µ1+5/8·(1−µ2) =
1
2
. In other words, the
adversary can set the probabilities over I(1) and I(2) such that even the Bayesian
aggregator who observes the distribution over posteriors precisely will have com-
plete uncertainty about the state in cases (e.1.1) and (e.2.0). All the more so is
this true for the ignorant aggregator.
Unfortunately for the adversary, there are two additional cases (e.1.0) and
(e.2.1), where the Bayesian aggregator succeeds in determining the state. However,
if we now introduce a third information structure, I(3), such that the posteriors
in the events (e.2.1) and (e.3.0) coincide, then a mixed strategy over the three
information structures can be constructed such that the same uncertainty will
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prevail when this posterior is observed.
For concreteness, the new information structure, I(3), is and the probabilities
I(3) :
ω = 0 ω = 1
s0
3
328
1
328
s1
81
328
243
328
over I(1), I(2), I(3) are 9
65
, 15
65
, 41
65
.
We proceed to define the information structures I(m) and the corresponding
mixed strategy iteratively such that the Bayesian aggregator faces complete uncer-
tainly unless the events are (e.1.0) and (e.m.1) are realized. In this construction,
the posterior of all the experts in all the information structures is either 1
4
or 3
4
.
It turns out that in order for the probability of the events (e.1.0) ∪ (e.m.1)
to vanish, we should repeat this construction with the pair of forecasts 1
2
±  (for
sufficiently small  > 0) instead of {1
4
, 3
4
}.
On the other hand, in order for the omniscient expert to perform well by
observing a sample from the distribution the value of  cannot be too small (note
that if we set  = 0 all the experts’ forecasts will be equal to 1
2
, in which case the
omniscient expert is also left clueless). Some tedious (yet standard) calculations
show that if we set  = Θ(
√
logn
n
) and let the mixed strategy for the adversary be
with support of size k = Θ(
√
n
log(n)
), then we have the following two phenomena:
• The events (e.1.0) ∪ (e.k.1) occur with small probability (and thus the
Bayesian aggregator cannot perform well).
• The omniscient expert can determine the state with high probability, because
the conditional distributions over posteriors I0(m) (i.e., I(m) conditional on
ω = 0) and I1(m) are sufficiently “far” from one another, for all 1 ≤ m ≤ k.
7 Discussion
We study non-Bayesian forecast aggregation and introduce an evaluation criterion
for such aggregation schemes. This criterion is based on the notion of regret with
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respect to a square loss utility function. There are various degrees of freedom in
the model as well as in choice of an evaluation criterion which provide room for
further research.
7.1 Choice of benchmark
In this paper we study the regret of aggregation, endowed to ignorant aggregators,
while using an omniscient expert as our benchmark. Recall that the omniscient
expert knows the information structure and also observes the actual signals experts
received. This benchmark, one may argue, is too challenging. A less challenging
benchmark should improve the aggregator’s performance. We discuss two such
alternatives.
7.1.1 The Bayesian aggregator
Recall the notion of a Bayesian aggregator introduced in section 6.1. This Bayesian
aggregator knows the information structure and the forecasts of the experts but
does not observe the experts’ private signals. Seemingly the regret associated with
a Bayesian aggregator is smaller than that associated with the omniscient expert.
Apparently, for the families of information structures studied here (Theorems 1
and Theorem 2), this is not true. This follows from the fact that for such infor-
mation structures both benchmarks entail a similar loss when the adversary uses
his Maxmin mixed strategy.
The disappointing regret obtained in Proposition 1, when the adversary has
no restriction on the choice of a strategy and can use correlated signals, cannot
be improved when using the Bayesian aggregator as a benchmark. This, however,
is not a straightforward observation. In fact, for information structure designed
in the proof of the proposition, the omniscient expert does remarkably well while
the Bayesian aggregator fails miserably. Nevertheless, a mild modification of said
information structure provides the desired outcome, where the ignorant aggregator
suffer a square loss of 1
4
−  (where  > 0 is arbitrarily small) while the Bayesian
aggregator suffers a square loss of zero.
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Below we formalize the notion of a Bayesian aggregator and state a proposition
analogous to Proposition 1.
A Bayesian aggregator’s posterior is
x˜(x1, x2) = P(ω = 1|x1(s1) = x1, x2(s2) = x2).
The corresponding regret is given by
RAO(f,P) = E(ω,s1,s2)∼P[(f(x1(s1), x2(s2))− ω)2]− E(ω,s1,s2)∼P[(x˜(x1(s1), x2(s2)))− ω)2].
Proposition 3. For general information structures, there is no aggregation scheme
that guarantees a regret below 1
4
.
The proof is relegated to Appendix C.
7.1.2 Best expert benchmark
Inspired by the regret-minimization literature in repeated expert advice settings
[Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006], one may compare the square loss of the ignorant
aggregator with the square loss of the better expert, namely,
RB(f,P) = E(ω,s1,s2)∼P[(f(x1(s1), x2(s2))− ω)2]− min
i=1,2
E(ω,si)∼P[(xi(si)− ω)2].
The result on Blackwell-ordered information structures remains the same, because
the best expert coincides with the omniscient expert in this environment. Inter-
estingly, this also holds for conditionally independent information structures with
two experts, where the minimal regret is between 0.0225 and 0.0260.9
For conditionally i.i.d. information structures, on the other hand, the ignorant
aggregator obviously can perform as good as the best expert (in expectation)
simply by mimicking Expert 1. By the symmetry of the problem, all experts
suffer the same expected loss. This simple observation holds for any number of
agents.
The minimal regret with respect to the best-expert benchmark in general infor-
mation structures, allowing for correlation, remains an interesting open problem
(even for the case of two experts).
9We omit the underlying reasoning that leads to this result.
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7.2 Extensions
Our model studies a simple setting where there are only two states of nature, the
scoring rule is set to be the square loss function, and we mostly focus on the case
of two experts. For conditional i.i.d. signals we provided a lower bound on the
regret that the aggregator can guarantee as a function of the number of experts
n. The simplicity of the problem was crucial for our ability to crack it. Thus,
extending our results to a larger state space or other scoring rules is by no means
straightforward. We hope to further understand this in future work.
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A Some intuition for the precision scheme
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1− α α
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x
1−x
1−y
x−y
1−y
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Figure 5: The martingale Px,y,α.
The zero-sum game that we study does not admit a pure maxmin strategy for
the adversary. However, it turns out that it always admits a simple maxmin strat-
egy for the adversary where the randomization is done only on two information
structures. The adversary chooses (purely) a martingale of posteriors X0, X1, X2
of length 2, where X1 is the posterior of the less-informed expert and X2 is the
posterior of the more-informed expert. The randomization is done only on the
identity of the less- and more-informed experts. Each expert is more-informed
with probability 1
2
. A formal methodology to capture this statement is to con-
sider an equivalent game Γ, where the adversary chooses a martingale of length 2,
and the ignorant aggregator is restricted to choosing an anonymous aggregation
scheme f(x1, x2) = f(x2, x1). The game Γ is equivalent to the original game in
the following respect:
• The value of these two games is equal.
• A maxmin strategy of the ignorant aggregator in Γ is a maxmin strategy in
the original game.
• A maxmin martingale of the adversary in Γ can be translated to a maxmin
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strategy in the original game by choosing the less and more informed players
with equal probability.
The existence of pure approximate optimal strategies in the game Γ is a corol-
lary of Sion’s minmax theorem [Sion, 1958]. Once this is verified we may focus
on studying the adversary’s minmax pure strategies. Note that the simplest pure
strategies available to the adversary that achieve positive regret against a best-
replying aggregator are martingales of the form demonstrated in Figure 5. Namely,
martingales for which X1 takes on two values x, y with probabilities α, 1− α and
X2 can take only two pairs of values, depending on the outcome of X1. These
pairs can be either (x, 1) or (0, y). The corresponding probabilities are uniquely
determined by the martingale condition. Let us denote this family of martingales
by M, where each M ∈M is a function of three parameters, M = Mx,y,α.
The importance of the family M is due to the following observation:
Proposition 4. The adversary’s minmax strategy is in M.
In hindsight, Proposition 4 obviously follows from Theorem 1, whose proof, in
turn, does not rely on this proposition. However, our original proof of Proposition
4 was independent and did not use the specific structure of the optimal aggregation
scheme. We omit the proof, which requires tedious computations.
If the ignorant aggregator knows the martingale Mx,y,α, then his anonymous
best reply is (we leave out the computational details):
fx,y,α(x1, x2) =

(1−α) (1−y)
(1−x) ·x+αxy ·y
(1−α) 1−y
1−x+α
x
y
if {x1, x2} = {x, y}
0 if x1 = 0 or x2 = 0
1 if x1 = 1 or x2 = 1.
(6)
The resulting relative loss for the ignorant aggregator is therefore:
L(fx,y,α,Mx,y,α) = 2(x− y)2
(1− α) (1−y)
(1−x) · αxy
(1− α) (1−y)
(1−x) + α
x
y
. (7)
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Given a pair of values, (x, y), the corresponding α that maximizes the relative
loss, L(Mx,y,α, fx,y,α), is denoted by α
∗(x, y). From the first-order conditions we
derive a closed-form solution for α∗(x, y):
α∗(x, y) =
√
y(1− y)√
y(1− y) +√x(1− x) .
An ignorant aggregator who does not know α, but knows x, y (because these
are the two forecasts of the experts), may assume that the adversary chooses
α = α∗. In such a case the ignorant aggregator’s forecast is obtained by replacing
α with the formula for α∗(x, y) in the first case of Equation (6):
Px,y,α∗(ω = 1|{x1, x2} = {x, y}) =
(√
y(1− y))x+ (√x(1− x))y√
y(1− y) +√x(1− x)
=
√
φ(x)√
φ(x) +
√
φ(y)
· x+
√
φ(y)√
φ(x) +
√
φ(y)
· y, (8)
where φ is the precision function. Note that this coincides with the precision
scheme whenever the two forecasts are sufficiently far apart.
Recall that we derive Equation (8) under the assumption that the adversary
chooses the value α = α∗(x, y), which is optimal against an aggregator who best
replies to a known martingale. Once the ignorant aggregator fixes the scheme pro-
vided by Equation (8), we can reconsider the optimal martingale for the adversary.
It turns out that in some cases the adversary can choose some value α 6= α∗(x, y)
and increase the relative loss. This happens only for martingales Px,y,α where
x − y < 0.4. The interim conclusion was that the scheme provided in Equation
(8) guarantees the regret 1
8
(5
√
5−11) for all martingales Px,y,α where x−y ≥ 0.4.
By adjusting the weights to ( φ(x)
φ(x)+φ(y)
, φ(y)
φ(x)+φ(y)
), whenever x− y < 0.4, we derive
the optimal scheme.10
10The adjustment was inspired by simulations that demonstrated the reason for the failure of
aggregation scheme (8) for close forecasts.
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B More on conditionally independent signals
Proposition (Proposition 2 restated). For conditionally independent information
structures, the average prior scheme guarantees a regret of 0.0250.
The proof of Proposition 2 is very similar to the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof of Proposition 2. We note that the arguments in the proof of Theorem 2 are
universal for all aggregation schemes (not particularly the average prior scheme).
The only change is in the definition of r(µ, x1, x2) (Equation (2)), where r in our
case is given by
r(µ, x1, x2) = (g(µ, x1, x2)− g(ep(x1, x2), x1, x2))2 .
Matlab maximization of the five-dimensional objective functionR(f, (µ,P1µ,y1,z1 ,P
2
µ,y2,z2))
(see Equation (4)) yields a global maximum of 0.0250 at the point µ = 0.114,
y1 = z1 = 0.114, y2 = 0, z2 = 0.744.
Now we turn to some intuition about Conjecture 3.
Conjecture (Conjecture 3 restated). For conditionally i.i.d. information struc-
tures, the minimal regret that can be guranteed is equal to 1
8
(5
√
5− 11) ≈ 0.0225,
and the average prior scheme gurantees this regret.
The proof of Theorem 2 shows that 1
8
(5
√
5−11) is a lower bound on the regret,
even in identically distributed information structures, simply because the pre-
sented information structure is identically distributed. To deduce a lower bound,
we note that indeed the maximum of the objective functionR(f, (µ,P1µ,y1,z1 ,P
1
µ,y1,z1))
(see Equation (4)) in the identical case is equal to 1
8
(5
√
5 − 11). The only argu-
ment in the proof of Theorem 2 that fails for identical distributions is the fact
that Equation (3),
R(f, (µ,P1,P2)) =
∑
j,k
α1jα
2
kR(f, (µ,P
1
µ,y1j ,z
1
j
,P2µ,y2k,z2k
)).
is no longer linear in the case where we add the identity restriction α1 = α2, but
rather turns out to be quadratic. We have failed to prove that the maximum of
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R(f, (µ,P1,P1)) is obtained in support-two distribution P1 = P1µ,x1,x2 (which will
suffice to prove the conjecture); however, numerical simulations support this latter
conjecture.
C Proof of Proposition 3
It is sufficient to show a mixed strategy of the adversary, where an ignorant ag-
gregator (who best replies to this strategy) cannot achieve a square loss smaller
than 1
4
−  whereas an “almost Bayesian” aggregator has a square loss of 0; that
is, he always knows the state.
We define the following two information structures P1(δ),P2(δ):
P1(δ) :
ω = 0 ω = 1
s2 s
′
2 s2 s
′
2
s1 1/4 0 s1 0 (1 + δ)/4
s′1 0 1/4 s
′
1 (1− δ)/4 0
P2(δ) :
ω = 0 ω = 1
s2 s
′
2 s2 s
′
2
s1 (1 + δ)/(4− 2δ2) 0 s1 0 (1− δ2)/(4− 2δ2)
s′1 0 (1− δ)/(4− 2δ2) s′1 (1− δ2)/(4− 2δ2) 0
In P1(δ) the induced posteriors of the experts are as follows:
(ω = 0, s1, s2)) (
1 + δ
2 + δ
,
1− δ
2− δ )
(ω = 0, s′1, s
′
2)) (
1− δ
2− δ ,
1 + δ
2 + δ
)
(ω = 1, s1, s
′
2)) (
1 + δ
2 + δ
,
1 + δ
2 + δ
)
(ω = 1, s′1, s2)) (
1− δ
2− δ ,
1− δ
2− δ ).
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In P2(δ) the induced posteriors of the experts are as follows:
(ω = 0, s1, s2)) (
1− δ
2− δ ,
1− δ
2− δ )
(ω = 0, s′1, s
′
2)) (
1 + δ
2 + δ
,
1 + δ
2 + δ
)
(ω = 1, s1, s
′
2)) (
1− δ
2− δ ,
1 + δ
2 + δ
)
(ω = 1, s′1, s2)) (
1 + δ
2 + δ
,
1− δ
2− δ ).
Assume that the adversary chooses the information structures P1(δ),P2(δ)
with equal probability 1
2
. An “almost Bayesian” aggregator knows the actual
information structure (P1(δ) or P2(δ)), and can deduce from the pair of forecasts
the state: in P1(δ), if forecasts are identical the state is ω = 1; otherwise the state
is ω = 0. In P2(δ) the opposite policy holds.
Let σ1 be the event that the information structure is P1(δ), the state is ω = 0,
and the signals are s1, s2. Let σ2 be the event that the information structure is
P2(δ), the state is ω = 1, and the signals are s1, s
′
2. An ignorant aggregator who
knows only the mixed strategy of the adversary, when he observes the pair of
forecasts (1+δ
2+δ
, 1−δ
2−δ ), assigns the probabilities
(p1, p2) = (
1
4
1
4
+ 1−δ
2
4−2δ2
,
1−δ2
4−2δ2
1
4
+ 1−δ
2
4−2δ2
) = (
2− δ2
4− 3δ2 ,
2− 2δ2
4− 3δ2 )
to the events (σ1, σ2) respectively. Therefore his optimal forecast is
2−2δ2
4−3δ2 =
1
2
±
O(δ).
Similar considerations can be applied to the cases where the pair of observed
forecasts are (1−δ
2−δ ,
1+δ
2+δ
), (1−δ
2−δ ,
1+δ
2+δ
), and (1+δ
2+δ
, 1−δ
2−δ ). In all these cases we get that the
optimal forecast is 1
2
±O(δ). Therefore the square loss of the ignorant aggregator
is at least (1
2
−O(δ))2 = 1
4
−O(δ), and we can set small enough δ such that O(δ)
in the last expression is less than .
D Proof of Theorem 4
We construct a mixed strategy for the adversary σ = σ(k) with the following two
properties that are stated as lemmas.
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Lemma 2. The expected square loss in σ(k) of a Bayesian aggregator who knows
σ(k) (but does not know the realized information structure) is at least 1
4
− 1
3k
.
Lemma 3. The omniscient expert incurs an expected square loss in σ(k) of at
most e−
n
72k2 .
Note that these two lemmas complete the proof of the theorem, because for any
aggregation scheme the expected loss in σ(k) is at least 1
4
− 1
3k
(because Bayesian
aggregation is the optimal aggregation). Therefore, the expected relative loss is
at least 1
4
− 1
3k
− e− n72k2 in σ(k). Therefore there exists an information structure
(in the support of σ(k)) for which the relative loss is at least 1
4
− 1
3k
− e− n72k2 . We
set k =
√
n
72 logn
, and obtain that the regret is at least
RDn ≥
(
1
4
− 1
3
√
72 log n
n
)
− 1
n
≥ 1
4
− 3
√
log n
n
.
We first present the mixed strategy of the adversary (i.e., a distribution over
information structures) σ(k) along with some preliminaries that will be useful in
the proofs of the lemmas.
We fix k, and we consider the sequence y1, ..., yk defined by
ym =
1
1 + (1− 2
2k+1
)2m−2
which is bounded by
1
2
≤ ym ≤ 1
1 + e−2
<
9
10
. (9)
In Table 2 we define the information structure for a single expert I(m) for 1 ≤
m ≤ k (i.e., a correlated distribution over states and signals). We denote the prior
Table 2: The information structure I(m).
ω = 0 ω = 1
s0 (
1
2
+ 1
4k
)(1− ym) (12 − 14k )(1− ym)
s1 (
1
2
− 1
4k
)ym (
1
2
+ 1
4k
)ym
of I(m) by
µm =
1
2
− 1
4k
+
1
2k
ym which is bounded by
1
2
≤ µm ≤ 1
2
+
1
5k
. (10)
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We set β1 = 1, and we recursively define β2, ..., βk by βm+1 = βm
µm
1−µm+1 . Equation
(10) implies that
βi ≤ βi+1 = µ
i
1− µi+1β
i ≤
1
2
+ 1
5k
1
2
βi = (1 +
2
5k
)βi.
Therefore,
1 = β1 ≤ βi ≤ (1 + 2
5k
)i−1β1 ≤ (1 + 2
5k
)k−1 ≤ e0.4 < 1.5. (11)
We normalize (βi) to a probability distribution by setting αm =
βm∑
i βi
. Note that
(αi) satisfies
αmµm = αm+1µm+1. (12)
The distribution σ(k) assigns a probability of αm to the information structure
I(m) (i.e., it randomizes over k information structures). Now we prove the two
lemmas.
Proof of Lemma 2. By the definition of I(m) (see Table 2), an expert who observes
s0 forecasts
1
2
− 1
4k
, and an expert who observes s1 forecasts
1
2
+ 1
4k
. Therefore, in
state ω = 0 the induced distribution over forecasts is
I0(m) =

1
2
− 1
4k
with probability 1
1−µm (
1
2
+ 1
4k
)(1− ym)
1
2
+ 1
4k
with probability 1
1−µm (
1
2
− 1
4k
)ym,
(13)
and similarly
I1(m) =

1
2
− 1
4k
with probability 1
µm
(1
2
− 1
4k
)(1− ym)
1
2
+ 1
4k
with probability 1
µm
(1
2
+ 1
4k
)ym.
(14)
The Bayesian aggregator (who knows σ) observes a sample of size n from the
distribution Iω(m) in the case where the realized (by σ) information structure is
I(m) and the realized (by nature) state is ω. This Bayesian aggregtor suffers an
expected square loss at least as high as a Bayesian aggregator (who knows σ)
and observes the distribution Iω(m) precisely rather than just a sample from it.
This follows from the fact that observing the distribution Blackwell dominates the
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information of a finite sample from it. Therefore it is sufficient to prove that a
Bayesian aggregator (who knows σ) and observes the distribution Iω(m) precisely
incurs a square loss of at least 1
4
− 1
k
.
The key property of the sequence (I(m))m=1,...,k is that I1(m) = I0(m+ 1) for
m = 1, ..., k − 1. To see this, we consider the likelihoods of the forecasts in the
two distributions:
(1
2
+ 1
4k
)ym
(1
2
− 1
4k
)(1− ym) =
(1
2
− 1
4k
)ym+1
(1
2
+ 1
4k
)(1− ym+1) ⇔
1
2
+ 1
4k
1
2
− 1
4k
(
1− 2
2k + 1
)−(2m−2)
=
1
2
− 1
4k
1
2
+ 1
4k
(
1− 2
2k + 1
)−2m
⇔(
1− 2
2k + 1
)2
=
( 1
2
− 1
4k
1
2
+ 1
4k
)2
By the definition of (αi) (Equation (12)), αmµm = αm+1(1− µm+1). Therefore, a
Bayesian aggregator who observes a distribution of forecasts J = I1(m) = I0(m+1)
assigns an equal probability of 1
2
to the two events that the information structure
is I(m) and the realized state is ω = 1, on the one hand, and that the information
structure is I(m + 1) and the realized state is ω = 0, on the other. Therefore,
in either such event the Bayesian aggregator will forecast 1
2
, and his square loss
will be 1
4
. Using inequalities (10) and (11) we get the following bound on the
aggregator’s square loss:
1
4
(1− α1(1− µ1)− µkαk) ≥ 1
4
(1− 1
2
1∑
i βi
− 0.51 βk∑
i βi
)
≥ 1
4
(1− 1
2k
− 0.511.5
k
) ≥ 1
4
− 1
3k
.
Proof of Lemma 3. According to the information structure I(m), conditional on
state ω = 1, the expected number of experts whose posterior is 1
2
+ 1
4k
equals
(1
2
+ 1
4k
)ym
(1
2
+ 1
4k
)ym + (
1
2
− 1
4k
)(1− ym) . (15)
Similarly, conditional on ω = 0, the expected number of experts whose posterior
is 1
2
+ 1
4k
is
(1
2
− 1
4k
)ym
(1
2
− 1
4k
)ym + (
1
2
+ 1
4k
)(1− ym) . (16)
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We denote by D(k,m) the difference in these expectations:
D(k,m) =
(1
2
+ 1
4k
)ym
(1
2
+ 1
4k
)ym + (
1
2
− 1
4k
)(1− ym) −
(1
2
− 1
4k
)ym
(1
2
− 1
4k
)ym + (
1
2
+ 1
4k
)(1− ym) .
Note that the function
D(y) =
(1
2
+ 1
4k
)y
(1
2
+ 1
4k
)y + (1
2
− 1
4k
)(1− y) −
(1
2
− 1
4k
)y
(1
2
− 1
4k
)y + (1
2
+ 1
4k
)(1− y) .
is monotonically decreasing in y ∈ [1
2
, 1] because the derivative
D(y)
dy
= − (
1
2
+ 1
4k
)(1
2
− 1
4k
) 1
2k
(2y − 1)
(1
2
− 1
4k
+ 1
2k
y)2(1
2
+ 1
4k
− 1
2k
y)2
is negative for y > 1
2
. Now we are able to bound the expression D(k,m),
D(k,m) ≥ (
1
2
+ 1
4k
) 9
10
(1
2
+ 1
4k
) 9
10
+ (1
2
− 1
4k
) 1
10
− (
1
2
− 1
4k
) 9
10
(1
2
− 1
4k
) 9
10
+ (1
2
+ 1
4k
) 1
10
=
18k + 9
20k + 8
− 18k − 9
20k − 8 =
9k
50k2 − 8 ≥
1
6k
,
(17)
when the first inequality follows from inequality (9) and the monotonicity of D(y).
Now we turn to the proof of the lemma. For every distribution I(m) in the
support of σ(k) we introduce an aggregation scheme (which depends on I(m))
that guarantees a square loss of at most e−
n
72k2 . This obviously implies that the
omniscient expert incurs at most the same loss. Our aggregation scheme has the
following simple form: it counts the fraction q of experts whose forecast is 1
2
− 1
4k
.
If q is closer to the expected fraction in state 1 (Equation (15)) then it forecasts 1.
Otherwise, if q is closer to the expected fraction in state 0 (Equation (15)) then it
forecasts 0. It never uses probabilistic forecasts. For this simple 0/1 aggregation
scheme the expected square loss is equal to the probability of a mistake. By
inequality (17) a mistake in the prediction occurs only in the case where the
fraction q is 1
12k
-far from the expected fraction. By Hoeffding’s inequality the
probability of this event is at most e−
n
72k2 , which is also a bound on the expected
square loss of the presented aggregation scheme.
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E Contradictory weather forecasts
Figure 6: Forecast in Yahoo! website
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Figure 7: Forecast in Accuweather website
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Figure 8: Forecast in Weather-Channel website
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